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Introduction
Since the security crisis of 2006–07, the East Timorese 
government has increasingly relied upon cash payment 
schemes to mitigate further conflict and to provide  
a form of social security. A series of schemes have  
provided payments to different groups, including:  
people displaced by the crisis, the military officers  
that helped inflame the crisis, the elderly and disabled,  
and female-headed households with school-aged  
children. By far the most significant — and expensive 
— scheme provides pensions to veterans of the resist-
ance struggle against the Indonesian occupation. This 
paper highlights who is benefiting from the veterans’ 
pension scheme and who is missing out, and exam-
ines some of the potential long-term ramifications.
Who is Benefiting? 
The veterans’ pensions are part of a veterans’ valouri-
sation scheme established by the government in 2006 
to provide symbolic recognition and material ben-
efits to veterans. The beneficiaries are East Timorese 
citizens who are able to prove their participation in 
the independence struggle as part of the ‘structures 
or organisations of the Resistance’. A ‘survival pen-
sion’ has also been established to support widows, 
orphans, elderly parents or siblings of veterans.1 
Pension payments vary according to the number of 
years a veteran ‘exclusively dedicated’ themselves to the 
resistance struggle, and their rank. Pensions range from 
between US$276 and US$575 per month for veterans 
who participated in the resistance for at least eight 
years or who ‘are incapable of work due to physical or 
mental disabilities resulting from their participation’, 
and US$230 and US$287.50 per month for surviving  
family members. A small number of ‘leading’ resistance 
figures receive a pension of US$750 per month for their 
‘outstanding contribution to the struggle’. One-off pay-
ments have also been made to veterans who took part 
in the resistance for between four to seven years and do 
not qualify for pensions, and scholarships provided to 
children of veterans and orphans of deceased veterans. 
In practice, because pensions are linked to a  
person’s ‘rank’ within resistance structures, and the  
number of years they were ‘exclusively dedicated’ to 
the struggle, veterans of the Armed Front (FALINTIL) 
are the primary beneficiaries. Those who participated 
in the Clandestine Front (the network of thousands of 
civilians based in the villages and towns who supported,  
and far outnumbered, combatants) are marginalised. 
Because they often concealed their activities behind 
study and work, many find it difficult to tally the  
requisite years of exclusive dedication. 
Women are also being marginalised. Most women 
are not receiving pensions for their own contribu-
tions to the resistance, but are instead receiving 
the ‘survival pension’ as widows and children of 
deceased male veterans. This is because, although 
they played critical roles as couriers, cooks, and carers 
for the wounded, women were less likely than men 
to take up arms or to hold designated ‘ranks’ within 
resistance structures (Kent and Kinsella 2014).
The scheme’s narrow definition of a veteran has led 
to tensions between the Clandestine and Armed Fronts, 
as former Clandestinos have protested the unfairness of  
the scheme. Other tensions have emerged due to the 
difficulties of verifying who is a legitimate veteran for 
the purpose of the scheme. Despite the establishment of 
special commissions to register and verify eligible vet-
erans, complaints that veterans have made false claims 
about the duration of their time in the resistance or that 
individuals’ periods of service have been under-recog-
nised, are common. There have been cases of disputes 
over payments resulting in violent incidents. 
Rising Pension Amounts
Over the past few years, veterans’ pension amounts 
and the number of beneficiaries have risen steadily. 
Between 2008 and 2012, 37,707 people received some 
form of veterans’ pension or payment — totalling 
$US199 million. During the 2012 election campaign, 
it was announced that pensions would be paid to an 
additional 27,000 veterans. Veterans’ payments of 
$US96 million absorbed 14 per cent of the $US1.6 
billion 2013 budget, and represents 19.5 per cent of 
the projected US$1.5 billion 2014 budget. 
The lowest veterans’ pension of US$276 per 
month is many times higher than the average Timor-
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ese income; in 2010, 41 per cent of the population 
lived on less than US$38 per month. And although 
the pension scheme currently only benefits one per 
cent of Timor-Leste’s population, more money is 
now spent on veterans than on health, education, 
or any sector except infrastructure. The veterans’ 
scheme also dwarfs the small amounts of social 
assistance available to other groups, including the 
elderly and female-headed households. For instance, 
the neediest female-headed households receive a 
monthly subsidy of between US$5 and US$30 for 
each child to assist with education needs (depend-
ing on the education level of the child). The elderly 
and disabled receive only US$30 per month. 
The priority accorded to veterans over other 
groups in society, and the rising pension amounts, 
reveals a great deal about politics and society in 
contemporary Timor-Leste. It suggests that the 
veterans’ scheme is a means of placating a powerful 
interest group who contributed to the escalation 
of the 2006–07 crisis, and who could become 
potential threats to the state. It also reflects, and 
further entrenches, an influential national narrative, 
enshrined in the constitution, which valourises the 
24-year resistance struggle (Wallis 2013). 
Long-Term Consequences
While the veterans’ pension scheme may have 
‘bought peace’ in the short term, it also potentially 
has negative long-term consequences. First, given 
the power of the veterans lobby, should the govern- 
ment choose to reduce pension amounts (for 
instance, if they become economically unsustainable,) 
this could be a source of instability and conflict. 
A second, related risk is that the current (and for-
mer Parliamentary Majority Alliance) government has 
sought to create a sort of clientelist loyalty between 
itself and veterans, who have assumed a vocal role 
in state affairs and exercise considerable influence in 
parliament. Recent expansions in the pension scheme 
have largely been due to pressure from veterans. 
Third, there is the risk that the scheme will 
have intergenerational impacts as, in addition to the 
scholarships provided under the scheme, veterans 
who receive pensions will be better able to educate 
their children. This kind of long-term impact is evi-
dent in Guinea-Bissau, where similar schemes have 
created intergenerational advantage for the descend-
ants of veterans.
Fourth, there is a risk that the scheme will gener-
ate a degree of dependence and expectation of further 
payment schemes. More veterans will likely register 
for pensions if the eligibility criteria for pensions 
expand. If the veterans’ pensions continue to rise, 
Timor-Leste could face a challenge similar to Guinea-
Bissau, where commitments to veterans have impeded 
the government’s ability to address other social issues. 
A fifth and related risk is that, by entrenching 
the economic and political power of a group of 
militarised, and predominantly male, former 
combatants, the veterans’ scheme may undermine the 
development of an inclusive national identity. Because 
the veterans’ scheme promotes a view of citizenship 
that is linked to a person’s role in the (armed) 
resistance struggle, those who cannot claim this status 
(among them women, Clandestinos, members of the 
younger generation, the diaspora, and those who were 
‘pro-integration’ supporters) are marginalised. 
Given the high levels of poverty and underdevelop-
ment in Timor-Leste, it would seem that a long-term, 
inclusive, approach to providing social security and 
mitigating societal conflict, might give more attention 
to targeting the neediest households, perhaps through 
the provision of a needs-based social safety net system. 
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Endnote
1     Statute of the National Liberation Combatants No. 3/2006; 
Decree Law on the Pensions of the Combatants and Martyrs 
of the National Liberation No. 15/2008, online at <http://
www.jornal.gov.tl/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/index-e.htm>.
